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MARKETS, MONOCULTURES, AND
MALNUTRITION: AGRICULTURAL TRADE POLICY
THROUGH AN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE LENS
Carmen G. Gonzalez*
INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 1994, hundreds of indigenous Mexican peasants took
part in the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, Mexico, to protest Mexico's
participation in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
as well as the Mexican government's repeal of a constitutional
provision safeguarding the right to land reform.' In the eyes of the
Zapatista rebels, NAFTA was the codification of economic policies that
marginalized and impoverished Mexico's indigenous peasantry by
depriving them of cultivable land in order to promote large-scale agro-
export production.2 The rebels feared that cheap food imports from the
United States and the elimination of government-guaranteed agricultural
prices would threaten the livelihoods of Mexico's small corn producers,
undermine food security, and increase migration to the United States.3
Subsequent studies documenting the adverse impact of trade
liberalization on food security, on the environment, and on the
* Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law. The author would like to
thank Colin Crawford, Steven Davison, James Kushner, Eileen Gauna, and Kristen Sheeran for
thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this article. The author would also like to express her
gratitude to Tseming Yang and the other members of the International Subcommittee of the
National Environmental Justice Advisory Council (NEJAC) for their insights on the meaning
of environmental justice at the international level. The views expressed in this article are those
of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the NEJAC or of the International
Subcommittee.
1. See Tim Golden, Mexican Troops Battling Rebels; Toll at Least 57, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 3, 1994, at A1; Tim Golden, In a Remote Mexican Village, Roots of Rebellion Are Bared,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1994, at Al; GEORGE A. COLLER & ELIZABETH LOWRY QuARATIELLO,
BASTA: LAND AND THE ZAPATISTA REBELLION 44-46, 87-88 (1999).
2. See Andy Gutierrez, Codifying the Past, Erasing the Future: NAFTA and the
Zapatista Uprising of 1994, 4 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVT. L. & POL'Y 143, 145-49 (1996-
1998); see also, Leonard Cavise, NAFTA Rebellion: How the Small Village of Chiapas is
Fighting for Its Life, HUM. RTS. Fall 1994, at 36.
3. See Gutierrez, supra note 2, at 153-55; see also Henry W. McGee, Jr., Mexican
Perspectives on Economic, Political and Cultural Implications of Free Trade, 12 CHICANO-
LATINO L. REv. 6-8 (1992) (discussing the potential impact of trade liberalization on Mexican
corn farmers).
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livelihoods of Mexican corn farmers have confirmed the validity of
these concerns.4
Trade liberalization under NAFTA has accelerated the trend toward
large-scale, export-oriented, chemical-intensive agricultural production
at the expense of small-scale subsistence farms.5 Mexican farmers have
experienced a 70 percent decline in real corn prices since 1994 as a
consequence of the influx of cheap, subsidized corn from the United
States.6 This catastrophic drop in corn prices has coincided with the
virtual disappearance of the Mexican government's agricultural
subsidies and price supports.7 Finding that the cost of corn production
exceeds the revenue gained by selling the corn, many Mexican farmers
have hired themselves out as laborers or have migrated to northern
Mexico or to the United States in order to earn the cash necessary to
support their families! Ironically, the drop in corn prices has not been
passed on to Mexican consumers. On the contrary, the price of tortillas
(a staple of the Mexican diet) increased three-fold in real terms between
1994 and 1999.' The decline in corn prices depressed rural incomes,
increased poverty and unemployment, reduced food security, and
4. See John Audley, Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Sandra Polaski, and Scott Vaughan,
NAFTA's Promise and Reality: Lessons From Mexico for the Hemisphere 61-87 (Carnegie
Endowment Report, Nov. 2003), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?
fa=view&id=1390&prog=zgp&proj=zted; Oxfam, Dumping Without Borders: How US
Agricultural Policies Are Destroying the Livelihoods of Mexican Corn Farmers (Oxfam
Briefing Paper No. 50, August 2003), http://www.oxfarn.org.uk/what-we-do/issuestraddebp50_.
corn.htm.; Alejandro Nadal, The Environmental and Social Impacts of Economic Liberalization
on Corn Production in Mexico (2000), http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/
livelihoods/corn_mexico.htm.
5. See Audley et al., supra note 4, at 76-77. Indeed, the Mexican agricultural sector
has been characterized by a growing economic divide between large-scale, vertically integrated
export-oriented farms (the beneficiaries of NAFTA) and small-scale subsistence farms (the
victims of NAFTA). Id. at 77. The tendency of Mexican subsidy payments to favor wealthy
large-scale farms rather than poor subsistence farms has exacerbated this development. Id. at
78.
6. See Oxfam, supra note 4, at 17.
7. See James C. McKinley, Jr., Where Poverty Drove Zapatistas, the Living is No
Easier, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at A14.
8. Id.
9. See Oxfam, supra note 4, at 18. Tortilla prices increased despite the precipitous
decline in corn prices due, in large part, to the domination of tortilla production in Mexico by
several large corporations with the market power to maximize profits at the expense of
consumers. Indeed, the largest of these Mexican tortilla producers financed several large-scale
expansion projects through the revenues generated by higher tortilla prices. See Nadal, supra
note 4, at 39.
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produced higher levels of migration from rural areas.'" Trade
liberalization in the corn sector also accelerated environmental
degradation, as wealthy farmers increased the use of pesticides and
fertilizers while poor farmers responded to depressed corn prices by
extending cultivation to more marginal lands." Finally, the NAFTA-
induced decline in corn prices jeopardized the genetic diversity of the
Mexican corn sector by undermining the rural institutions upon which
traditional maize growing is based. 2
The Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, Mexico, is an example of fierce
resistance by local and indigenous farming communities to development
strategies that threaten their lands, their livelihoods, and the health of
local ecosystems. Similar struggles have been waged in many other
countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Brazil, Madagascar,
Argentina, and India.13 In Sarawak, Malaysia, for example, hunters and
10. See id. at 6, 17; Nadal, supra note 4, at 3, 7-8.
11. See Oxfam, supra note 4, at 8-9; Nadal, supra note 4, at 3,8,81-86. Large, export-
oriented farms are largely responsible for the increased use of pesticides and fertilizers and
greater consumption of scarce freshwater resources in the wake of NAFrA. For small farmers,
the post-NAFrA decline in the price of staples, such as corn, increased poverty, and left
farmers with little choice but to clear forests in order to stabilize their incomes by expanding
the land under cultivation. Id. at 63-64.
12. See Nadal, supra note 4, at 90; Audley et al., supra note 4, at 71-72. Another
important threat to Mexico's enormously diverse varieties of corn is the possibility that
genetically modified corn crops might cross-pollinate with indigenous varieties. Despite
Mexico's 1998 ban on the import of genetically modified corn seeds, genetically modified corn
has been found in Mexican fields, sparking scientific concern and public debate about genetic
contamination. Audley et al., supra note 4, at 71.
13. See RAMACHANDRA GUHA, ENViRONMENTALISM: A GLOBAL HISTORY 99-100,117
(2000) (describing the efforts of Malaysian hunters and farmers to halt commercial logging of
their forests and analyzing the struggles of the Brazilian rubber tappers to preserve the Amazon
rain forest); see, e.g., Genevieve Michon et al., The Damar Agroforests of Krui, Indonesia:
Justice for Forest Farmers, in PEOPLE, PLANTS, AND JUSTICE: THE PoLITICs OF NATURE
CONSERVATION 159-203 (Charles Zerner ed., 2000) (describing the resistance of Indonesian
farmers to the conversion of their forests to specialized oil palm or acacia plantations); Aidan
Rankin, "The Land of ourAncestor's Bones": Wichi People's Struggle in the Argentine Chaco,
in GREEN GuERILLAS: ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS AND INITIATIVES IN LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN 40-46 (Helen Collinson, ed., 1997) (describing the struggle of the Wichi
Indians of northern Argentina to claim the land cultivated by their ancestors for thousands of
years); Lucy Jarosz, Defining Deforestation in Madagascar, in LIBERATION ECOLOGIES:
ENVIRONMENT, DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 148-64 (Richard Peets and Michael
Watts eds., 1996) (explaining how peasants in Madagascar resisted government efforts to
deprive them of their livelihoods by blaming shifting cultivators for the country's massive
deforestation while failing to address the devastating impact on Madagascar's forests of coffee
cash-cropping); see MADHAV GADGIL AND RAMACHANDRA GUHA, ECOLOGY AND EQurrY: THE
2006]
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farmers organized blockades and demonstrations to preserve their
forests from commercial logging, which had already contaminated
rivers, exposed soils to erosion, and destroyed plants and animals used
as sources of food. 14 Similarly, in the Brazilian Amazon, rubber tappers
joined forces with indigenous communities to preserve millions of acres
of forest from conversion to pastureland. 5
These grassroots struggles in developing countries over the
ecological necessities of life (land, water and food) have been referred
to as "the environmentalism of the poor,"1 6 or simply "environmental
justice, 17 and have been studied extensively by scholars working in the
interdisciplinary field of political ecology. 8 Like the environmental
justice movement in the United States, these social movements in
developing countries draw their activist base primarily from those who
are directly affected by environmental abuse and who view the
environmental conflict as part of a larger struggle against political and
economic marginalization. 9 What these ecological movements in the
developing world have in common is an emphasis on the survival needs
of the poor, defined in terms of adequate and equitable access to food,
water, and living space.2"
Much of the literature on struggles for environmental justice in the
United States and in developing countries has highlighted the
disproportionate concentration of environmental hazards in poor
communities and in areas populated by racial and ethnic minorities."
USE AND ABUSE OF NATURE IN CONTEMPORARY INDIA (1995) (describing social conflicts in
India over access to and control of natural resources).
14. See GUHA, supra note 13, at 99-100.
15. See id. at 117.
16. See RAMACHANDRA GUHA AND JOAN MARTINEZ-ALIER, VARIMTES OF
ENVIRONMENTAuSM: ESSAYS NORTH AND SOuTH xxi (1997).
17. See Charles Zerner, Toward a Broader Vision of Justice and Nature Conservation,
in PEOPLE, PLANTS&JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 14-15.
18. See, e.g., LIBERATION ECOLOGIES, supra note 13, at 3-9.
19. See GUHA, supra note 13, at 105-06 (describing the key features of the
environmentalism of the poor in the developing world); LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER,
FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE MOVEMENT17-18; 32-33 (2001) (describing the characteristics and goals of
environmental justice activists in the United States).
20. See Zerner, supra note 17, at 15; see also Joan Martinez-Alier & Lori Ann Thrupp,
The Political Ecology of the South, 19 LATIN AM. PERSPECIVES 148, 149-50 (1992).
21. See Alf Hornborg, Towards an Ecological Theory of Unequal Exchange:
Articulating World System Theory and Ecological Economics, 25 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 128
[14:345
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However, it is equally important to evaluate how human societies
distribute access to environmental necessities. 22 Food is a quintessential
environmental necessity that is critical to human survival.23 Indeed, the
right to food is recognized as a basic human right in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights24 and in the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 25  The obligation of states to
provide adequate food is also contained in the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child.26 Food production, however,
poses significant human health and environmental risks, including
exposure to toxic agricultural chemicals, excessive freshwater
(1998); COLE&FOSTER, supra note 19, at 54-58, 167-83; Vicki Been, Coming to the Nuisance
or Going to the Barrios? A Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24
EcOLOGY L.Q. 1(1997); UNEQUALPROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTALJUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES
OF COLOR (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994); Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental
Injustice: Weighing Race and Class as Factors in the Distribution of Environmental Hazards,
63 U. COLO. L. REV. 921 (1992).
22. See Homborg, supra note 21, at 128. A relatively small portion of the
environmental justice literature in the United States has focused on access to environmental
necessities, such as food and water, or access to environmental amenities, such as open space
in urban areas. See, e.g., Catherine O'Neill, Variable Justice: Environmental Standards,
Contaminated Fish, and "Acceptable" Risk to Native Peoples, 19 STAN. ENVTL L.J. 3 (2000);
Samara Swanston, Environmental Justice and Environmental Quality Benefits: The Oldest,
Most Pernicious Struggle and Hope for Burdened Communities, 23 VT. L. REv. 545 (1999).
23. See CARY FOWLER & PAT MOONEY, SHATTERING: FOOD, POL'ICS AND THE LOSS
OFGENETIc DIVERSITY 3-18 (1996) (describing the importance of the environment as a source
of food and discussing the transition from hunting and gathering to agriculture). Food security
is an important issue in the United States as well as in developing countries. The U.S.
Department of Agriculture estimates that approximately 9.7 percent of the U.S. population is
food insecure. Mark Nord, Kyle Jemison, and Gary Bickel., USDA, Food Assistance and
Nutrition Research Report No. 2, Prevalence of Food Insecurity and Hunger 1996-1998, at 1
(1999), http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/fanrr2/fanrr2.pdf. In South Central Los Angeles,
for example, a 1992 survey to assess priority community problems and needs revealed that local
residents viewed food access, food quality and food price as their most immediate and
widespread concern. ROBERT GOTTLIEB, ENVIRONMENTALISM UNBOUND: EXPLORING NEW
PATHWAYS FORCHANGE 182 (2001). For a thoughtful analysis of the underlying causes of food
insecurity in the United States, including the disproportionately high rate of food insecurity in
communities of color, see Guadalupe T. Luna, The New Deal and Food Insecurity in the "Midst
of Plenty," 9 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 213 (2004).
24. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/10, art. 25 (Dec. 12, 1948).
25. International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, G. A. Res. 2200A,
art. 11 (Dec. 16, 1966).
26. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, arts. 24 &
27, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
HeinOnline  -- 14 Mich. St. J. Int'l L. 349 2006
Michigan State Journal of International Law
utilization, soil degradation, deforestation, and pollution of water
supplies by agricultural runoff.27 According to the United Nations'
2005 Millenium Ecosystem Assessment Synthesis Report, natural
resource degradation is occurring most rapidly in the world's poorest
regions and is likely to impede efforts to combat poverty, disease and
hunger in the developing world.28
Proponents of liberalized trade in agricultural products claim that
removing agricultural trade barriers will alleviate poverty and hunger
in the developing world by increasing global agricultural output and by
promoting economic growth and environmental protection in
developing countries. 29  Agricultural trade liberalization promises to
open up markets in industrialized countries to developing-country
farmers,3" to remove subsidies that result in the over-exploitation of land
and the excessive use of pesticides and fertilizers,31 and to reduce
industrialized country surplus production that enters world markets at
low prices and undercuts developing-country farmers.32 According to
a recent World Bank report, if all regions of the world eliminated
27. See generally PHILLIPS FOSTER & HOWARD D. LEATHERS, THE WORLD FOOD
PROBLEM: TACKLING THE CAUSES OF UNDERNUTRITION IN THE THIRD WORLD 211-20 (1999).
28. The United Nations' Millennium Ecosystem Assessment is an effort by over 1300
ecologists and other researchers from 95 countries to assess the capacity of the world's
ecosystems to perform vital functions like water filtration, flood control, soil formation, crop
pollination and food provision. United Nations Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Synthesis
Report 9-12 (2005), http://www.milleniumassessment.org. The report concluded that over 60
percent of these functions have been impaired by human activity and that the most rapid
deterioration is taking place in the world poorest regions. Id. at 16-17, 90-99.
29. See Frederick M. Abbott, GATT Law on Agricultural Trade in Light of the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, in GATT AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION
IN AGRICULTURE 102 (Masayoshi Honma et al. eds., 1993); Thomas J. Schoenbaum,
Agricultural Trade Wars: A Threat to the GAIT and Global Free Trade, in GATT AND TRADE
LIBERALIZATION IN AGRICULTURE 89 (Masayoshi Honma et al. eds., 1993); see Walden Bello,
Editorial, Perspective: The WTO Debate 1I: Does Global Trade Need the WTO?,
BUSINESSWORLD (Philippines), Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 WL 28767914 (quoting Philippe Legrain,
special advisor to WTO director-general Mike Moore, regarding his belief that by lowering
trade barriers, the WTO promotes economic growth, which helps the environment).
30. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Agricultural Trade Wars: A Threat to the GATT and
Global Free Trade, in GATT" AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN AGRICULTURE 88-89 (Masayoshi
Honma et al. eds., 1993).
31. See Michael R. Redclift et al., International Trade, Environment and the CAP:
Complex Relationships, in AGRICULTURE AND WORLD TRADE LIBERALIZATION: SOCIO
ENVIRONMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 2-3 (Michael R.
Redclift et al. eds., 1999); Frederick M. Abbott, supra note 29, at 101.
32. See Schoenbaum, supra note 30, at 88-89.
[14:345
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agricultural subsidies and import barriers, the projected global income
gain for 2015 is estimated to be $265 billion, with nearly half of that
gain accruing to developing countries."
Critics of trade liberalization emphasize that the real cause of hunger
is poverty.34 Indeed, even the World Bank has recognized that global
food production has outpaced population growth for the past several
decades, but that the poor simply lacked the resources to purchase what
was produced." Consequently, the critics contend, measures that
purport to alleviate world hunger must be evaluated based on their
effect on poverty and inequality.36 In addition, the environmental impact
of these measures must be assessed in order to ensure that they do not
degrade the natural resource base necessary for food production.37
This article contributes to the environmental justice literature and to
the literature on trade and the environment by examining the impact of
historical and contemporary international trade and agricultural policy
on food security and on the environment in the developing world. The
environmental justice movement has long emphasized that
environmental justice is inextricably linked to social and economic
justice,3 and environmental justice scholars have attempted to make
these connections explicit in their writings. 39 This article continues that
tradition by analyzing the economic, social and environmental
consequences of agricultural trade liberalization in poor communities
in developing countries. In so doing, the article explores the meaning
of environmental justice at the international level and illustrates the
33. See Dominique van der Mensbrugghe & John C. Beghin, Global Agricultural
Reform: What is at Stake?, in GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
115-16 (M. Ataman Aksoy & John C. Beghin, eds. 2004).
34. See JOHN MADELEY, FOOD FOR ALL: THE NEED FOR A NEW AGRICULTURE 32-42;
FRANCES MOORE LAPPE ET. AL, WORLD HUNGER: TWELVE MYTHS 8-14 (1998).
35. See WORLD BANK: POVERTY AND HUNGER: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR FOOD
SECURITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1 (1986). Accord, LAPPE, supra note 34 at 9, 16-17.
36. See LAPPE, supra note 34, at 40.
37. See id. at 41.
38. See, e.g., Principles of Environmental Justice, Proceedings, The First National
People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit xiii (October 24-27, 1992), reprinted in
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY AND REGULATION 22-24 (Clifford Rechtschaffen &
Eileen Gauna, eds. 2004); Michel Gelobter, et al., The Soul ofEnvironmentalism: Rediscovering
Transformational Politics in the 21st Century 22-29 (2005), http://www.rprogress.org/
soul/soul.pdf.
39. See, e.g., COLE & FOSTER, supra note 19; Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of
Environmental Justice, 30 ENVTL L. REP. 10681, 10698 (2000).
20061
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importance of reviewing trade agreements and international lending and
development assistance programs through an environmental justice
framework that is historically grounded and that takes into account both
ecological and socioeconomic impacts.
Part I of the article describes the extent of undernourishment in the
developing world, examines its underlying causes, and discusses the
relationship between hunger and environmental degradation.
Part I places the contemporary debate over agricultural trade policy
in historical context. It points out that the most food insecure
developing countries tend to rely on agricultural exports as a major
source of foreign exchange earnings, and it explores the causes and
consequences of this pattern of trade and production. In particular, Part
II explains that this economic specialization promotes food insecurity
and environmental degradation by diverting prime agricultural lands to
export production, concentrating land ownership in the hands of a few
wealthy landholders, relegating the majority of farmers to less
productive and often ecologically fragile lands, and encouraging
chemical-intensive, monocultural farming techniques that produce
serious ecological harm. In addition, economic specialization in
agricultural exports deprives many developing countries of the income
needed for productive investment by subjecting export revenues to the
vicissitudes of world market prices for agricultural commodities and to
the declining terms of trade for agricultural products in relation to
manufactured goods.
Part III examines the impact of the free market economic reforms
imposed on developing countries by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO)
during the last twenty-five years on the patterns of agricultural trade and
production described in Part II. Part HII explains that these economic
reforms institutionalized a double standard in the rules governing
agricultural trade that permits protectionism in the industrialized world
while requiring developing countries to open their markets to foreign
competition. This double standard allows the United States and the
European Union to dump highly subsidized agricultural commodities on
developing country markets while depriving developing countries of the
tools needed to protect resource-poor farmers from unfair competition.
The influx of cheap, subsidized food discourages domestic food
production in developing countries and undermines the livelihoods of
small farmers, who comprise the vast majority of the developing
[14:345
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world's malnourished people. In addition, the export-oriented policies
promoted by the IMF and the World Bank to guarantee debt repayment
accelerate the utilization in many developing countries of chemical-
intensive, monocultural agricultural production techniques-to the
detriment of human health and the environment.
Part IV examines whether "leveling the playing field" by imposing
the same free market reforms on both developed and developing
countries will alleviate poverty, promote food security and enhance
environmental stewardship in the developing world. Part IV concludes
that trade liberalization in the industrialized world is necessary to
address the inequities in the global trading system that impoverish
developing countries and degrade the environment. However, applying
the same rules to poor countries and wealthy countries will only
reinforce the economic dominance of the latter, and will ultimately
exacerbate food insecurity and environmental degradation in the
developing world. Only an asymmetrical set of trading rules that
require developed countries to dismantle agricultural subsidies while
permitting certain forms of protectionism in developing countries can
begin to alter the inequitable patterns of agricultural trade and
production that foster environmental injustice in the developing world.
Part V discusses alternative strategies that developing countries might
adopt in order to protect the environment, promote economic
development, and enhance food security.
Part VI concludes with some observations about the meaning of
environmental justice at the international level.
I. POVERTY, HUNGER AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION: ROOT
CAUSES AND CRITICAL LINKAGES
According to the most recent survey by the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO), there are approximately 852 million
chronically undernourished people in the world, of whom 815 million
reside in developing countries.' Food insecurity in the developing
world kills more than five million children every year, produces
enormous human suffering, costs developing countries billions of
40. U.N. FOOD & AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION, THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN
THE WORLD 2004 at 6 (2004), http://www.fao.orgldocrep/fao/007/y5650ely5650eOO.pdf
[hereinafter FAO, STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY 2004].
20061
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dollars in foregone economic activity, and contributes to outbreaks of
violent conflict.41 Despite the pledge by member countries of the United
Nations to cut world hunger in half by 2015 (using 1990-1992 as a
baseline), progress in hunger reduction has stalled in recent years, and
the number of malnourished people is growing in most of the
developing world.42
Hunger in the developing world is often exacerbated by unsustainable
farming practices that degrade the natural resources necessary for food
production.43 Chemical-intensive, monocultural farming practices have
triggered a wide range of environmental problems in both developed
and developing countries, including diminution of agricultural
productivity, soil degradation, contamination and depletion of fresh-
water reserves, and loss of biodiversity. 4 Environmental degradation in
developing countries has also increased poverty, provoked mass
migrations, intensified racial and ethnic tensions, and incited violent
conflict over dwindling access to vital natural resources.4 5
In order to understand the underlying causes of undernourishment
and environmental degradation in the developing world, it is necessary
to begin with four key propositions:
First, contrary to popular misconception, hunger is not a function of
food scarcity. Based upon economist Amartya Sen's pioneering study
41. Id. at 8-13; U.N. FOOD & AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION, THE STATE OF FOOD
INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 2002, Toward the Summit Commitments 5-7 (2002),
http://www.fao.orgl/docrep/005/y7352e/y7352eOl.htm#PO_0 [hereinafter FAO, STATE OF
FOOD INSECURITY 2002].
42. U.N. FOOD & AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION, THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN
THE WORLD 2003 at 4 (2003), http://www.fao.org/docrep/fao/006/j0083e/j0083e00.pdf
[hereinafter FAO, STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY 20031.
43. See MADELEY, FOOD FOR AlL, supra note 34, at 26-30.
44. See, e.g., THE FATAL HARVEST READER: THE TRAGEDY OF INDUSTRIAL
AGRICULTURE 121-47, 167-221 (Andrew Kimbrell ed., 2002); Brian Halweil, Farming in the
Public Interest, in THE WORLD WATCH INSTITUTE, STATE OF THE WORLD 2002, 51, 53-56
(2002); David A. Adelman & John H. Barton, Environmental Regulation for Agriculture:
Towards a Framework to Promote Sustainable Intensive Agriculture, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3,
4 (2002); Jules N. Pretty et al., Policy Challenges and Priorities for Internalizing the
Externalities of Modern Agriculture, 44(2) J. ENVTL PLAN & MGMT. 263, 264 (2001); LORI
ANN THRupp, WORLD RES. INST., LINKING BIODIVERSITY AND AGRICULTURE: CHALLENGES
AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUSTAINABLE FOOD SECURITY 4-10 (1997).
45. See THOMAS F. HOMER DIXON, ENVIRONMENT, SCARCITY AND VIOLENCE 73-103,
133-68 (1999); LEIFOHLSSON, SWEDISH INTERNATIONALDEVELOPMENT AGENCY, LIVELIHOOD
CONFLICTS: LINKING POVERTY AND ENVIRONMENT AS CAUSES OF CONFLICT (2002),
http://www.padrigu.gu.setohlsson/files/Livelihoods.pdf.
[14:345
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of famine' and on the World Bank's influential 1986 report on world
hunger,47 it is now widely accepted that lack of access to food rather
than inadequate supply is the primary cause of hunger.48 Indeed, food
production world-wide has kept far ahead of population growth for the
last several decades,49 and many of the developing countries
experiencing chronic undernourishment are net food exporters.' People
go hungry because they are poor-because they lack the resources with
which to grow or purchase food." Consequently, efforts to solve the
problem of hunger in the developing world must target poverty and
inequality.
Second, poverty and undernourishment in developing countries are
concentrated in rural areas. 2 Approximately 75 percent of the poor in
the developing world are rural dwellers.53 Most are small farmers
whose livelihoods depend on selling their agriculture output. 4 Thus,
46. See generally AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT
AND DEPRIVATION (1981).
47. WORLD BANK, POVERTY AND HUNGER, supra note 35, at 1.
48. See JENNY EDKINS, WHOSE HUNGER? CONCEPTS OF FAMINE, PRACTICES OF AID 43-
49 (2000); JOHAN POTTIER, ANTHROPOLOGY OF FOOD: THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF FOOD
SECURITY 142-43 (1999);GORDON CONWAY, THE DOUBLY GREEN REVOLUTION: FOOD FOR ALL
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 4-5, 286-87 (1997); E.M. YOUNG, WORLD HUNGER 2-7 (1997);
STEPHEN DEVEREUX, THEORIES OF FAMINE 57-82 (1993); FRANK ELLIS, AGRICULTURAL
POLICIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 302-11 (1992).
49. See WORLD BANK, POVERTY AND HUNGER, supra note 35, at 1; LAPPE, supra note
34, at 8.
50. See LAPPE, supra note 34, at 9.
51. See GEORGE KENT, FREEDOM FROM WANT: THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE FOOD 11-12
(2005); WORLD BANK, POVERTY AND HUNGER, supra note 35, at 1; MADELEY, FOOD FOR AL,
supra note 34, at 32-34; CONWAY, supra note 48, at 4-5.
52. FAO, STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY 2004, supra note 40, at 25; FAO, STATE OF
FOOD INSECURITY 2003, supra note 42, at 4. Furthermore, the undernourished urban dwellers
in the developing world are frequently migrants from rural areas who have not yet succeeded
in finding a means of earning a living in cities ill-equipped to handle the influx of newcomers.
See MARCEL MAZOYER, PROTECTING SMALL FARMERS AND THE RURAL POOR IN THE CONTEXT
OF GLOBALIZATION ch. 2.2 (2001), http://www.fao.orgldocuments/show-cdr.asp?urlfile=/
DOCREP/007/Y 1743E/Y 1743E00.HTM.
53. See FAO, STATE OFFOOD INSECURITY 2003, supra note 42, at 16; INT'LFUND FOR
AGRIC. DEV. (IFAD), RURAL POVERTY REPORT 2001: THE CHALLENGE OF ENDING RURAL
POVERTY 16 (2001), http://www.ifad.org/poverty/index.htm.
54. See Kevin Watkins & Joachim von Braun, Time to Stop Dumping on the World's
Poor, in INT'L FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INST. (IFPRI), TRADE POLICIES AND FOOD SECURITY
2 (2002-2003), http://www.ifpri.org/pubs/books/ar2002/ar02e1.pdf; MADELEY, FOODORALL,
supra note 34, at 20.
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policies and programs that provide food to developing countries free of
charge or at subsidized prices may exacerbate hunger by depressing
agricultural commodity prices and depriving poor farmers of the income
needed to pay taxes and to buy vital consumer goods not produced on
the farm.55
Third, economic diversification and industrialization are essential to
poverty alleviation and to the promotion of food security. 56 A food
secure country is one that can grow, import, or obtain as aid the food
necessary to meet the needs of its population." The most food insecure
developing countries are those that rely on a small number of primary
agricultural commodities to finance the importation of food products
and manufactured goods.5 8 Poor harvests, fluctuations in world market
prices for agricultural products, and the declining terms of trade for
agricultural commodities vis-a-vis manufactured goods can interfere
with the ability of these countries to purchase food and other essential
items in international markets and can deprive these countries of export
earnings needed for productive investment. 59 According to the U.N.
Food and Agriculture Organization, as many as forty-three developing
55. See, e.g., JAMES WESSEL, TRADING THE FUTURE: FARM EXPORTS AND THE
CONCENTRATION OFECONOMIC POWER IN OUR FOOD SYSTEM 168 (1983) (discussing how food
aid to developing countries undercuts the prices received by poor farmers in low-income
countries and exacerbates poverty); Harvesting Poverty: The Unkept Promise, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
30, 2003, at A.20 (explaining that the dumping of cheap, subsidized food on world markets by
the U.S. has undermined the livelihoods of poor farmers in the developing world).
56. See JEAN DREZE & AMARTYA SEN, HUNGER AND PUBuC ACTION, reprinted in THE
AMARTYA SEN AND JEAN DREZE OMNIBUS 76-77, 168-70 (1999); Eric S. Reinert, Increasing
Poverty in a Globalized World: Marshall Plans and Morgenthau Plans as Mechanisms of
Polarization of World Incomes, in RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 470 (Ha-Joon
Chang ed., 2003).
57. See CHRISTOPHER STEVENS ET. AL, THE WTO AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE AND
FOOD SECURITY 18 (2000).
58. See id. at 14; U.N. ECON. COMMISSION ON LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
(ECLAC), THE SOCIAL PANORAMA OFLATIN AMERICA, 112(2003).
59. See PETER ROBBINS, STOLEN FRUIT: THE TROPICAL COMMODITIES DISASTER 2-3,
7-15(2003); JAMES M. CYPHER& JAMES L. DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
86 (1997); FAO, STATE AND FOOD INSECURITY 2004, supra note 40, at 12-13; YOUNG, supra
note 48, at 1-42. The deterioration in the terms of trade for agricultural commodities vis-4-vis
manufactured goods was first identified approximately 50 years ago by economists Raul
Prebisch and Hans Singer, and has been confirmed by subsequent empirical data. See FAO,
STATE OFFOOD INSECURITY 2004, supra note 40 at 10, 12-13; CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 59,
at 87 (Box 3.5), 177-80. As a result of this phenomenon, countries that rely on agricultural
exports to generate foreign exchange earnings have experienced severe economic losses and
mounting debt. See FAO, STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY 2004, supra note 40 at 12, 20-21.
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countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean
depend on agricultural exports for over half of export revenues and
depend on a single agricultural commodity to generate over twenty
percent of total foreign exchange earnings.6°
Fourth, biological diversity is necessary for ecosystem health and for
the integrity of the world's food supply.6 The cultivation of uniform
crop varieties (in lieu of planting diverse crops and diverse genetic
strains of a particular crop) increases vulnerability to pest and disease
infestation, depletes the soil of vital nutrients, promotes dependence on
harmful agrochemicals, increases the risk of catastrophic crop failure in
the event of a blight, and adversely affects human nutrition by reducing
the variety of foods consumed.62 Thus, economic policies that directly
or indirectly promote monocultural production techniques jeopardize
the biological diversity necessary to protect the health and resilience of
the world's agroecosystems.63
In order to understand the relevance of these points to contemporary
trade and agricultural policy, it is important to examine the historic
roots of hunger and ecologically unsustainable farming practices in the
developing world.
II. THE COLONIAL LEGACY: AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND
PRODUCTION IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The patterns of trade and production that produce undernourishment
and environmental degradation in the developing world have their
origins in colonialism.' Colonialism relegated the colonized
"periphery" to production of raw materials for the benefit of the
colonizing "core."65 By the late nineteenth century, places as diverse as
60. See FAO, STATE OF FOOD INSECURrrY 2003, supra note 42, at 17.
61. See THRUPP, supra note 44, at 5-20.
62. See id., at 26-32; FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 23, at 82-83.
63. See THRUPP, supra note 44, at 1-2; Fred Gale, Economic Specialization Versus
Ecological Diversification: The Trade Policy Implications of Taking the Ecosystem Approach
Seriously, 34. ECOLOGICAL ECON. 285, 289-90 (2000).
64. See YOUNG, supra note 48, at 41-42.
65. See ERIc R. WOLF, EUROPE AND THE PEOPLE WITHOUT HISTORY 140-41, 310-15
(1997); MADELEY, supra note 34, at 13; FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 23, at 40-41;
VANDANA SHIVA, MONOCULTURES OF THE MIND: PERSPECTIVES ON BIODIVERSITY AND
BIOTECHNOLOGY 78-79 (1993). As John Stuart Mill candidly observed, "Our West Indian
colonies, for example, cannot be regarded as countries .... The West Indies... are the places
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India (cotton producer), Cuba (sugar producer), Egypt (cotton
producer), Argentina (beef and wheat producer), and Ghana (cocoa
producer) had come to specialize in the production of primary
agricultural commodities for export.66 After political independence,
many developing countries continued to specialize in agro-export
production and to import manufactured goods.67 This economic
specialization diverted prime crop land in developing countries from
food production to cash crop production and encouraged reliance on
food imports to satisfy domestic nutritional requirements. 68 Economic
specialization in agro-export production also degraded the environment
by replacing biodiverse agroecosystems with monocultures that required
large amounts of chemical pesticides and fertilizers. 69 This economic
specialization deprived developing countries of the stable and steady
revenue stream needed for productive investment by subjecting their
export earnings to the vagaries of the weather, the fluctuations in world
markets for agricultural commodities, and the declining terms of trade
for agricultural commodities in relation to manufactured goods.7"
Finally, in the developing countries that practiced plantation agriculture,
colonialism concentrated land ownership in the hands of the rural elite
(and subsequently foreign and domestic agro-export enterprises), and
relegated small farmers to marginal, ecologically fragile lands.7
where England finds it convenient to carry on the production of sugar, coffee, and a few other
tropical commodities." John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, with Some of their
Applications to Social Philosophy, in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 693 (J.M.
Robson ed., 1965).
66. See YOUNG, supra note 48, at 41; WOLF, supra note 65, at 310-41 (describing the
worldwide specialization in agro-export production); Carmen G. Gonzalez, Seasons of
Resistance: Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security in Cuba, 16. TUL.ENVTL.L.J. 685,689-
92 (2003) (describing Cuba's specialization in sugar production).
67. See YOUNG, supra note 48, at 41.
68. See WESSEL, supra note 55, at 166-67.
69. See SlVA, supra note 65, at 78 (discussing how colonization resulted in the
displacement of biodiversity in the colonized regions of the world with monocultures of raw
materials for the benefit of European industry); FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 23, at 180-81
(describing the plunder by the colonial powers of natural resources from one colony in order
to establish plantations in another and explaining how the vulnerability of genetically uniform
crops required the use of costly and ecologically harmful agrochemicals).
70. See ROBBINS, supra note 59, at 2-3, 7-15; CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 59, at 86;
FAO, STATE OFFOOD INSECURITY 2004, supra note 40, at 12-13; YOUNG, supra note 48, at 41-
42.
71. See FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 23, at 95-96; YOUNG, supra note 48, at 66.
[14:345
HeinOnline  -- 14 Mich. St. J. Int'l L. 358 2006
Agricultural Trade Policy
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the Green Revolution
extended monocultural production techniques in developing countries
from cash crops to food crops.72 As a consequence of the Green
Revolution, the world's food supply came to rely on an increasingly
smaller number of crops and on a narrower genetic base." Farmers
throughout the developing world abandoned traditional biodiverse
cultivation techniques in favor of uniform seeds, chemical fertilizers,
and synthetic pesticides manufactured by transnational corporations
headquartered in the industrialized world.74 In developing countries, the
environmental and food security consequences of the Green Revolution
included agrochemical contamination of surface waters and ground-
water, increased pesticide-related death and illness, soil degradation,
loss of ecosystem biodiversity, loss of traditional food crops, and
increased vulnerability of the food supply to pests and disease.75
The Green Revolution was an immense success from the standpoint
of food production,76 but it exacerbated hunger in the developing world
by aggravating poverty and inequality.77 First, the Green Revolution
was inherently biased against poor farmers in developing countries
because the new seeds only produced high yields in response to the
application of expensive inputs unaffordable to many farmers, including
synthetic fertilizers, chemical pesticides, and irrigation systems.78
Second, the increase in food production resulting from the Green
Revolution depressed agricultural prices, and thus deprived small
farmers in developing countries of the cash income necessary to
purchase agricultural inputs, pay taxes, and purchase goods not
72. See FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 23, at 56-60 (describing the Green
Revolution's promotion of uniform high-yielding seeds in order to increase food production).
73. See id., at 63-81 (examining the world-wide loss of crop diversity in the aftermath
of the Green Revolution).
74. See id., at 75-76,130-31; THRUPP, supra note 44, at 35.
75. See CONWAY, supra note 48, at 86-104; FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 23, at 76;
THRUPP, supra note 44, at 32-33.
76. See CONWAY, supra note 48, at 44-45; KEITH GRIFFIN, ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES
FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 148 (1990).
77. See KEITH GRIFFIN, THE POLTICAL ECONOMY OF AGRARIAN CHANGE: AN ESSAY
ON THE GREEN REVOLUTION 51-52 (1974); CONWAY, supra note 48, at 69-72; YOUNG, supra
note 59, at 72; LAPPE ET AL, supra note 34, at 60; FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 23, at 58-59.
78. See FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 23, at 58-59; LAPPE ET AL., supra note 34, at
60; FRANCINE R. FRANKEL, INDIA'S GREEN REVOLUTION, 193-94 (1971); ANDREW PEARSE,
SEEDS OF PLENTY, SEEDS OF WANT, 161-63 (1980); VANDANA SHIVA, THE VIOLENCE OF THE
GREEN REVOLUTION: THIRD WORLD AGRICULTURE, ECOLOGY AND PoLITICs 45 (1991).
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produced on the farm.79 Many small farmers abandoned the land, and
rural poverty and hunger increased.8" Indeed, one review of over 300
published reports on the Green Revolution concluded that eighty
percent of these reports found that the Green Revolution aggravated
rural poverty and inequality in developing countries.8 ' Third, the Green
Revolution's emphasis on increasing food production was often
promoted as an alternative to land reform and other redistributive
measures -the very reforms that have been credited in subsequent
studies with poverty alleviation, rural development, and enhanced food
security in the developing world.83
79. See LAPPE ET AL, supra note 34, at 62.
80. See FRANCES MOORE LAPPE & JOSEPH COLLINS, FOOD FIRST: BEYOND THE MYTH
OFSCARCITY 135-48 (1978); GRIFFIN, supra note 76, at 158; SHIVA, supra note 78, at 176-77;
Frederick H. Buttel & Laura T. Reynolds, Population Growth, Agrarian Structure, Food
Production and Distribution, in FOOD AND NATURAL RESOURCES 325, 344 (David Pimentel
& Carl W. Hall eds., 1989).
81. See Donald K. Freebairn, Did the Green Revolution Concentrate Incomes?: A
Quantitative Study of Research Reports, 23 WORLD DEV. 265,265-79 (1995). As the Freebairn
analysis acknowledges, a minority of studies concluded that the Green Revolution's overall
social impact was positive. See, e.g., RITA SHARMA & THOMAS T. POLEMAN, THE NEW
ECONOMICS OF INDIA'S GREEN REVOLUTION: INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT DIFFUSION IN UT-rAR
PRADESH 16-18, 239, 241-44 (1993); YUJIRO HAYAMI & MASAO KIKUCHI, A RICE VILLAGE
SAGA: THREE DECADES OF GREEN REVOLUTION IN THE PHILIPPINES 121-24, 227-38 (2000);
MURRAY J. LEAF, SONG OF HOPE: THE GREEN REVOLUTION IN A PUNJAB VILLAGE 46-58, 64,
94-95, 104-05, 131-33, 140-41 (1984); PETER B. HAZELL & C. RAMASAMY, THE GREEN
REVOLUTION RECONSIDERED 239-44 (1991); Robert W. Herdt, A Retrospective View of
Technological and Other Changes in Philippine Rice Farming 1965-1982,35 ECON. DEV. AND
CULTURAL CHANGE 329, 347-48 n.2 (1989).
82. See GRIFFIN, supra note 76, at 147; SHIVA, supra note 78, at 47; FOWLER &
MOONEY, supra note 23, at 61; LAPPE ET AL, supra note 34, at 64-65; Ellen Misser, et al., Food
from Peace: Breaking the Links between Conflict and Hunger, FOOD, AGRICULTURE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT DISCUSSION PAPER 24, 12, http://www.ifpri.org/2020/dp/dp24.pdf.
83. See FAO, STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY 2002, supra note 41; Toward the Summit
commitments, at 26. Indeed, even World Bank analysts have recognized the important role of
land reform in reducing poverty and promoting economic development. Klaus Deininger et al.,
How Land Reform Can Contribute to Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction: Empirical
Evidence from International and Zimbabwean Experience (2002),
http://InwebI 8.worldbank.org/ESSD/ardext.nsf/24ByDocName/TopicsLandReform; see also
IFAD, supra note 53, at 76; Daniel Maxwell and Keith Wiebe, Land Tenure and Food Security:
A Review of Concepts, Evidence, andMethods 4-6, http://agecon.lib.umn.edu; Timothy Besley
& Robin Burgess, Land Reform, Poverty Reduction and Growth: Evidence from India 20-21
(1998), http://sticerd.Ise.ac.uk/dps/de/dedpsl3.pdf; Peter M. Rosset, The Multiple Functions
and Benefits of Small Farm Agriculture in the Context of Global Trade Negotiations 11-14
(1999), http://www.foodfirst.org/pubs/policybs/pb4.pdf.
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The pauperization of small farmers in the developing world was
exacerbated by United States Public Law 480 (the so-called "Food for
Peace Program")," which depressed agricultural prices in developing
countries by making U.S. surplus agricultural production available to
developing countries at reduced prices or free of charge as food aid.85
Furthermore, farmers in the developing world were harmed by the
lavish agricultural subsidies maintained by the U.S. and other
industrialized countries (which placed additional downward pressure on
world agricultural commodity prices) and by the tariff and non-tariff
import barriers that impeded developing country farmers from obtaining
access to developed country markets.8 6 In sum, the Green Revolution,
Public Law 480, and the subsidies and import barriers maintained by the
U.S. and other industrialized countries increased hunger in the
developing world by depressing food prices, rendering small farmers
destitute, and depriving developing countries of badly needed export
earnings.87
84. Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, ch. 469,68 Stat. 454
(1954) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1736e (1982)); Food for Peace Act of 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-808, § 3(c), 80 Stat. 1526 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1427, 1431,143 lb, 1446a-7, 1691-1736e
(1982)).
85. See WESSEL, supra note 55, at 152-55, 168.
86. See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Institutionalizing Inequality: The WTO Agreement on
Agriculture, Food Security, and Developing Countries, 27 COLuM. J. ENVTL. L. 433, 447-49
(2002).
87. An analysis of the ecological and socioeconomic consequences of agricultural trade
policy would be incomplete without some discussion of the rapidly expanding commercial
cultivation of genetically modified crops. Because a full assessment of the unique risks and
benefits of biotechnology is beyond the scope of this article, biotechnology will be discussed
only to the extent that it raises environmental and food security issues directly relevant to issues
raised by conventional agricultural trade and production. For example, the cultivation of a small
number of genetically modified crops threatens to reproduce and accelerate the monocultural
production techniques introduced by colonialism and favored by the Green Revolution, thereby
reducing the genetic base of the world's food supply and increasing dependence on inputs
(including seeds, fertilizers and pesticides) produced by transnational agribusiness. See
generally, Liz Orton, GM Crops- Going Against the Grain (May 2003),
http://www.actionaid.org.ukf792/gm-crops.html (discussing the ecological and socioeconomic
implications of biotechnology in the developing world). Biotechnology also introduces new
environmental risks, such as gene transfer from genetically modified crops to wild relatives and
the acceleration of resistance to pesticides and herbicides (as a consequence of the cultivation
of crops genetically modified to produce herbicide tolerance and insect resistance). See
generally Jules Pretty, The Rapid Emergence of Genetic Modification in World Agriculture:
Contested Risks and Benefits, 28(3) ENVTL. CONSERVATION 248 (2001).
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The following section examines the impact on undernourishment and
environmental degradation of the free market economic reforms
adopted by developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s under the
auspices of the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO. While these
economic reforms did not create the patterns of agricultural trade and
production that promote hunger and environmental degradation in the
developing world, the article argues that the reforms nevertheless
reinforced these harmful trade and production patterns.
III. THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK AND THE WTO:
INSTITUTIONALIZING A DOUBLE STANDARD IN AGRICULTURAL
TRADE
In the decades following World War II, the U.S. and other
industrialized countries generously subsidized domestic agricultural
production, and utilized a wide array of tariff and non-tariff import
barriers to protect domestic farmers from foreign competition.88 By
contrast, the majority of developing countries lacked the resources to
subsidize agriculture and generally taxed farmers in order to finance
industrialization. 9 The 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(1947 GATT) contained a variety of exceptions and omissions that
compromised its ability to curb industrialized countries' agricultural
subsidies and import restrictions.' ° Thus, free market reforms in the
agricultural sector did not commence until the imposition of structural
adjustment programs on developing countries by the IMF and the World
Bank in response to the debt crisis of the 1980s and until the entry into
force of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture in the mid-1990s.91
88. See THEGATTURUGUAYROUND: ANEGOTIATINGHISTORY (1986-1992) 125, 141,
155-56 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993); Aksoy, supra note 33, at 37.
89. See THE GATTURUGUAY ROUND, supra note 88, at 154-57; Aksoy, supra note 33,
at 37.
90. See Gonzalez, supra note 86, at 440-46 (explaining why the measures adopted by
industrialized countries to protect the agricultural sector were largely permitted under the 1947
GATT); Jonathan Carlson, Hunger, Agricultural Trade Liberalization, and Soft International
Law: Addressing the Legal Dimensions of a Political Problem, 70 IOWAL. REv. 1187, 1222-57
(1985) (analyzing the 1947 GATT's failure to curb agricultural protectionism).
91. See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization, Food Security and the
Environment: the Neoliberal Threat to Sustainable Rural Development, 14 J. TRANSNAT'LL.
AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 419, 457-60 (2004) (explaining that free market reforms in the
agricultural sector were imposed on the developing world initially pursuant structural
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The debt crisis of the 1980s had its origins in the 1973 quadrupling
of petroleum prices by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC). 92 In response to OPEC price increases, many non-
oil-producing developing countries borrowed money from the major
commercial banks in order to finance the importation of petroleum-
based agricultural inputs as well as the petroleum needed for
industrialization.93 Eager to earn interest on the oil revenues deposited
in their coffers by OPEC nations, the commercial banks actively
encouraged developing country borrowing.94 Regrettably, many of the
loans were contracted at variable interest rates, and the loan proceeds
were often misappropriated by developing country elites or squandered
on ill-conceived industrialization projects and weapons purchases.95
When the second OPEC oil price increase in 1979-80 caused interest
rates to skyrocket, many developing countries borrowed money simply
to repay the debt on old loans.96 Agro-exporting countries were
particularly affected by rising oil prices, soaring interest rates, and
mounting debt because the 1979-80 oil price shock coincided with a
sharp decline in world market prices for agricultural commodities. 97 As
foreign exchange earnings dropped, many developing countries were
unable to repay their debts. 9 By the mid-1980s, nearly three quarters of
Latin American countries and two thirds of African countries were
operating under structural adjustment programs overseen by the World
Bank and the IMF in order to guarantee loan repayment. 99
The structural adjustment programs mandated by the IMF and the
World Bank exacerbated the problem of agro-export specialization in
adjustment programs and subsequently pursuant to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture).
92. See RICHARD PEET ET AL., UNHOLY TRINITY: THE IMF, WORLD BANK AND WTO
71(2003).
93. See id.; SUSAN GEORGE, A FATE WORSE THAN DEBT: THE WORLD FINANCIAL
CRISIS AND THE POOR 28-29 (1990).
94. See PEET ET AL., supra note 92, at 71-72; GEORGE, supra note 93, at 29. Because
low-income developing countries were generally regarded as more risky, they tended to borrow
from multilateral lenders (such as the World Bank and the IMF) rather than from commercial
banks. David M. Roodman, Still Waiting for the Jubilee: Pragmatic Solutions for the Third
World Debt Crisis, 155 WORLD WATCH PAPER 8 (2001).
95. See PEET ET AL., supra note 92, at 71; BELINDA COOTE, THE TRADE TRAP 33-34
(1992).
96. See GEORGE, supra note 93, at 14-24, 27-28; ROODMAN, supra note 94, at 8.
97. See GEORGE, supra note 93, at 28; PEET ET AL, supra note 92, at 72.
98. See PEET ET AL., supra note 92, at 72, 74-75.
99. See id. at 75.
2006]
HeinOnline  -- 14 Mich. St. J. Int'l L. 363 2006
Michigan State Journal of International Law
the developing world by requiring developing countries to increase
agricultural exports in order to boost the foreign exchange earnings
available to service the foreign debt." In addition, the IMF and the
World Bank required developing countries to slash subsidies, to lower
tariffs, and to eliminate non-tariff import barriers. 1 ' As a consequence
of structural adjustment, agricultural policy in many developing
countries came to be characterized by a high level of market openness"
-in sharp contrast to the protectionist policies of industrialized
countries. 1 3  Because structural adjustment was not imposed on
industrialized countries, these free market reforms in the developing
world instituted a double standard that plagues the agricultural sector to
this day: protectionism in wealthy developed countries; trade liberaliza-
tion in poor developing countries."
Structural adjustment had a negative impact on food security and the
environment in developing countries. First, the withdrawal of
agricultural subsidies, the reduction of extension services, and the
elimination of subsidized credit slashed the income of poor farmers and
made agricultural inputs increasingly unaffordable.0 5 Second, the
100. See GEORGE, supra note 93, at 59-60; MADELEY, supra note 34, at 117.
101. See MICHAELCHOSSUDOVSKY, THE GLOBAUSATION OFPOVERTY: IMPACTS OFTHE
IMF AND WORLD BANK REIoRMS 62-63 (1997); GEORGE, supra note 93, at 52.
102. See U.N. FOOD & AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION, THE STATE OF FOOD AND
AGRICULTURE 2000, Half a Century of Food and Agriculture, The 1980s 26 (2000),
http://www.fao.org.
103. See David Reed, An Instrument of Global Economic Policy, in STRUCTURAL
ADJUSTMENTS, THE ENVIROMENT, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 3, 13 (1995) (quoting a
study on trade liberalization performed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development).
104. See Gonzalez, supra note 91, at 458.
105. See JOHN MADELEY, HUNGRY FOR TRADE: How THE POOR PAY FOR FREE TRADE
77 (2000); The Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Newtork, The Policy
Roots of Economic Crisis and Poverty: A Multi-Country Participatory Assessment of Structural
Adjustment- 116-18(2002), http:www.saprin.org/SAPRI-Findings.pdf. The SAPRIN study was
a multi-country analysis of structural adjustment sponsored by the World Bank and by a
network of civil society groups. Based on a on a four-year process of consultation and research
in nine countries located in four continents, the study analyzed the economic and social
consequences of structural adjustment in seven distinct areas: manufacturing, finance,
employment, agriculture, mining, state enterprise privatization, and education and health care.
Id. at i-ii. One of the chief criticisms voiced in the chapter on agricultural trade was the failure
of policy-makers (the LMF, the World Bank, and the relevant national ministries) to consult with
the communities most directly affected by the structural adjustment policies. Id. at 113. As
explained in Part VI of this article, transparency and public participation are critical to the
promotion of environmental justice.
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reduction or elimination of import barriers undermined the livelihoods
of small farmers by subjecting them to unfair competition from highly
subsidized U.S. and EU agricultural producers. 1 6 Third, structural
adjustment reduced food security at the national level by glutting world
markets with competing developing country exports, thereby depressing
the foreign exchange earnings required by developing countries for the
purchase of food and other essential items not produced domestically. 0 7
At the same time, the one-sided nature of structural adjustment
permitted industrialized countries to continue to exclude developing
country farmers from developed country markets and to use subsidies
to undermine the competitiveness of developing country exports in
world agricultural markets.' Finally, the emphasis on agro-export
production harmed the environment in developing countries by promot-
ing the expansion of chemical-intensive, monocultural production
technique. '09
The express objective of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture was to
"establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system" by
requiring the reduction over time of subsidies and tariffs.1 ' However,
106. See MADELEY, supra note 34, at 119-20 (explaining that the ability of developing
countries to utilize exemptions in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture to protect small farmers
from highly subsidized U.S. and EU agribusiness was constrained by IMF-imposed structural
adjustment policies and discussing the devastating impact on small farmers of the influx into
the developing world of cheap imported food); MICHAEL E. CONROY ET AL., A CAUTIONARY
TALE: FAILED U.S. DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA 14 (1996); MADELEY, supra
note, 105, at 76-77.
107. See ROBBINS, supra note 59, at 29-30; MADELEY, supra note 34, at 154-55;
GEORGE at 60-61; COOTE, supra note 95, at 34-35.
108. See THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 88, at 155-56. Indeed a study
published in 1990 concluded that developing countries incurred losses of approximately $35
billion per year as a consequence of industrialized country protectionism. See World Trade
Talks Near Collapse over Farm Subsidies Row, FIN TIMES, Oct. 19, 1990, at 1.
109. SAPRIN, supra note 105, at 124-26. In response to the glut of certain traditional
agricultural export products on world markets, many developing countries diversified their
agricultural exports and began to cultivate non-traditional agricultural commodities, such as
fruits, vegetables, oils, and nuts. While this strategy may have eased the decline in export
earnings, the farms themselves were planted in monocultures and thus required high levels of
ecologically harmful agrochemical inputs. See CONROY ET AL, supra note 106, at 13-14, 18-
19,138-39; Reed, supra note 103, at 17; LORI ANN THRUPP, BITTERSwEET HARVESTS FOR
GLOBAL SUPERMARKETS: CHALLENGES IN LATIN AMERICA'S AGRICULTURAL EXPORT BOOM
17-18, 94-95 (1995).
110. Agreement on Agriculture, Preamble 2 (April 15, 1994), http://www.wto.org/
english/doese/legale/14-ag.pdf [hereinafter Agreement on Agriculture]; see GONZAIEZ, supra
note 86, at 452-458 (discussing the main provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture).
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the Agreement perpetuated the double standard discussed above by
permitting developed countries to continue to utilize certain trade-
distorting agricultural subsidies (subject to reduction over a specified
period) while prohibiting developing countries that did not historically
employ these subsidies from doing so in the future.' l Indeed, the
Agreement was riddled with ambiguities that enabled developed
countries to evade the Agreement's subsidy and tariff reduction require-
ments and to maintain high levels of agricultural protectionism." 2 Total
subsidies for agriculture in industrialized countries increased after the
Agreement on Agriculture came into effect-from $304 billion in 1986-
88 to $324 billion in 2001-2003.'13 In addition, tariff barriers in
developed countries for imported agricultural products remained high. 1 4
By contrast, many developing countries had already eliminated non-
tariff barriers and significantly reduced tariffs on imported agricultural
products pursuant to IMF and World Bank-mandated structural
adjustment policies. 15 In effect, the WTO Agreement on Agriculture
institutionalized the pre-existing double standard in world agricultural
trade: protectionism in developed countries; trade liberalization in
developing countries."
16
As a consequence of this double standard, the United States and the
European Union are currently wreaking havoc on the livelihoods of
poor farmers in the developing world by dumping agricultural products
on world markets at below the price of production."' For example, the
United States is exporting wheat at prices 28 percent below the cost of
production; soybeans at prices 10 percent below the cost of production;
111. See Gonzalez, supra note 86, at 463-68.
112. See id. at 459-68 (explaining why the Agreement on Agriculture enabled
industrialized countries to maintain high levels of protectionism).
113. ORGANIZATIONS FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD),
AGRICULTURAL PoLIcIEs IN OECD COUNTRIES: AT A GLANCE 17 (2004).
114. See Gonzalez, supra note 86, at 460-63 (discussing why the market access
requirements of the Agreement on Agriculture produced little change in tariff barriers in
industrialized countries).
115. U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. [FAO], FAO SYMPOSIUM ON AGRICULTURAL TRADE
AND FOOD SECURITY, Paper No. 3, 5 (Sept. 1999), http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/meeting/
x3065E.htm.
116. See Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization, Food Security and the Environment, supra note
91, at 471.
117. See SOPHIA MURPHY ET AL., INST. FOR AGRIC. AND TRADE POLICY, WTO
AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE: A DECADE OF DUMPING 1 (2005),
http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?ReflD--48532.
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corn at prices 10 percent below the cost of production; cotton at prices
47 percent below the cost of production; and rice at prices 26 percent
below the cost of production." 8 Industrialized country subsidies and
protectionism cost developing countries approximately $24 billion per
year in foregone agricultural and agro-industrial income. 9 Notwith-
standing its historic advocacy of agriculture-led development strategies,
even the World Bank has acknowledged in a recent publication that "a
development strategy based on agricultural commodity exports is likely
118. See id. at 2. While Brazil recently mounted a successful WTO challenge to the
United States' cotton subsidies, few developing countries can afford the expense of protracted
litigation. See Appellate Body Report, United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005); Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Loses Final Ruling on Subsidies for
Cotton, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2005. Furthermore, the remedy for WTO violations - the right to
impose hefty tariffs on the offending imports-is often infeasible for developing countries
unwilling to jeopardize valuable trade and diplomatic relationships with the United States and
other major industrialized countries. See MURPHY, supra note 118, at 7.
119. See INT'L FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INST., HOW MUCH DOES IT HURT?: THE IMPACT
OF AGRICULTURAL TRADE PoLIcIES ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, at 2 (Aug. 2003),
http://www.agtradepolicy.orgloutput/resource/IFPRI.pdf. In addition to the harm caused by
the double standard in the rules governing international agricultural trade, two other WTO
agreements threaten to advance the interests ofU.S. agribusiness at the expense of small farmers
and the environment in the developing world. The WTO Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures forbids government restrictions on the importation of
genetically modified seeds in the absence of "sufficient scientific evidence." See Agreement on
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), art. 2.2, Apr. 15,
1994, http://www.wto.org/english/docs-ellegal-e/15-sps.pdf. The SPS Agreement is arguably
inconsistent with the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, which recognizes the precautionary
principle and allows such restrictions even in the absence of strict scientific proof of harm.
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 10.6, Jan. 29,
2000, http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cartagena-protocol-en.pdf. In May 2003, the United
States, Canada and Argentina initiated challenges before the WTO to the EU's de facto
moratorium on the importation of genetically modified organisms. See John W. Boscariol &
Orlando E. Silva, Genetically Modified Organisms at the Centre of Major WTO Dispute, LAW.
WKLY., Mar. 26, 2004. The outcome of the dispute is likely to elucidate the relationship
between the two agreements and to have enormous consequences for developing countries that
are currently resisting U.S. efforts to promote genetically modified crops. Another WTO
agreement, the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
requires developing countries to give genetically modified seeds patent-like intellectual property
protection, thus protecting the profits of transnational corporations at the expense of the
traditional rights of farmers to save, sell and breed seeds. See Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 27.3(b), Apr. 14, 1994, http://www.wto.org/english/
docs-ellegal-e/27-trips.pdf. See generally, Ruchi Tripathi, Food Patenting-A Threat to Food
Security, 11 (July 2001), http://www.actionaid.org/resources/pdfs/patenting.doc (explaining
why many developing countries have resisted U.S. pressure to provide strong intellectual
property protection to the products of the seed industry).
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to be impoverishing in the current agricultural policy environ-
ment ... ."120
IV. WILL ELIMINATING THE DOUBLE STANDARD SOLVE THE
PROBLEM?
Many proponents of agricultural trade liberalization would agree with
much of the above analysis, but would argue that the solution is to
"level the playing field" by requiring the United States, the European
Union, and other industrialized countries to curtail and eventually
eliminate agricultural subsidies and to reduce tariffs on imported
agricultural products.' 2' In other words, the claim is that free market
reforms, if implemented in an even-handed manner in both developed
and developing countries, would address the market distortions and
inequities identified in Part IT of this article.
22
Reducing industrialized country agricultural subsidies and import
barriers is an essential first step toward addressing the inequities in
international trade that contribute to hunger and environmental
degradation in the developing world, but it is not sufficient to resolve
these problems. 23 Phasing out agricultural protectionism in developed
countries will produce significant short-term benefits in the developing
world, including higher incomes for farmers, enhanced incentives for
domestic food production, increased export earnings, and diversification
into food processing (if industrialized country tariffs that escalate
according to the degree of processing are eliminated).' 24 However,
formal equality among vastly unequal trading partners is likely to
120. See M. Ataman Aksoy & John C. Beghin, Introduction and Overview, in GLOBAL
AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 33, at 3.
121. Indeed, the New York Times published a series of editorials in 2003 and 2004
decrying the damaging impact in the developing world of industrialized country agricultural
protectionism. The editorials advocated free market reforms in the United States and other
developed nations in order to establish "a fairer playing field." The editorials are available at
http://www.nytimes.com/harvestingpoverty. See also van der Mensbrugghe, supra note 33, at
118-36 (quantifying the benefits of agricultural trade liberalization in both developed and
developing countries).
122. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 90, at 1209-20.
123. See Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization, Food Security and the Environment, supra note
91, at 488-89.
124. See id. at 488.
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sharpen rather than reduce existing inequities in the long term. 12 Trade
liberalization, even if applied in an even-handed manner to both
developed and developing countries, is likely to aggravate hunger and
environmental degradation in developing countries in the long run for
three reasons.
First, the trade liberalization requirements imposed under the
auspices of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and pursuant to IMF
and World Bank-sponsored structural adjustment programs are designed
to address market distortions caused by government intervention, but
fail to address the market distortions caused by the domination of
agricultural trade by a small number of transnational corporations. For
example, five agrochemical companies control over sixty-five percent
of the global pesticide market. 126 Five grain trading corporations control
over seventy-five percent of the world's cereals trade. 127 Similar market
concentrations exist for other commodities.1 2' The market power of
these corporations allows them to extract monopolistic prices for key
agricultural inputs and to dictate prices for agricultural outputs-to the
detriment of small farmers who are essentially price-takers caught in the
vise of two groups of powerful transnational enterprises. 129 Even if
industrialized country agricultural subsidies and import barriers are
lifted, developing country farmers cannot compete effectively with
transnational agribusiness. 30  Structural adjustment and the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture constrain the ability of developing countries
to use subsidies to nurture domestic agro-export or food processing
industries or to use import barriers to protect domestic farmers from
foreign competition. 31 By ignoring the distortions caused by market
125. See id. at 489-90.
126. See Halweil, supra note 44, at 68 (Table 3-2).
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See SOPHIA MURPHY, INST. FOR AGRiC. AND TRADE PoLIcy, MANAGING THE
INVISIBLE HAND: MARKETS, FARMERS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, at 21-29, 32 (2002),
http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library/uploadedfiles/Managing-the-InvisibleHand_2.pdf;
Vertically integrated corporations dominate almost every aspect of the production and
distribution of agricultural products, from the sale of inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and
equipment) to the processing, shipping and marketing of agricultural output. MADELEY, supra
note 34, at 121-23.
130. See Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization, Food Security and the Environment, supra note
91, at 492.
131. See Gonzalez, Institutionalizing Inequality, supra note 86, at 464-66, 479-80.
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concentration in the agricultural sector and by depriving developing
countries of important tools to mitigate this problem, agricultural trade
liberalization reinforces the economic dominance of transnational
agribusiness at the expense of the poor in the developing world.
Second, developing countries will be required to make significant
economic concessions in order to persuade industrialized countries to
reduce agricultural subsidies and import barriers. Many of these
concessions, such as further reductions in industrial tariffs and greater
market access for manufactured goods, threaten to erode the already
limited ability of developing countries to intervene in the economy in
order to promote those industries most likely to contribute to economic
development.'32 Contrary to the free market prescriptions of the IMF,
the World Bank and the WTO, nearly all industrialized countries
(including the United States, Germany, France, Japan, and the United
Kingdom) achieved their economic might through the use of a broad
array of state interventionist measures, such as subsidies, tariffs, state
financing of important industries, and even state-sponsored acquisition
of intellectual property through industrial espionage. 3 Most recently,
132. In the WTO negotiations on Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA), industria-
lized countries are pressing developing countries to substantially reduce tariffs on manufactured
goods. Such concessions by developing countries may result in the loss of badly needed tariff
revenues, and may expose developing countries to de-industrialization and loss of jobs if local
industries find themselves unable to compete with exports. See Oxfam International, Oxfam
International Contribution Regarding NAMA Negotiations, Apr. 25-29,2005 (WTO, Geneva),
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what-we-do/issues/tradedownloads/sub-nama.pdf; Friends of the
Earth International, What You Need to Know About NAMA, October 2004, http://www.foei.org/
publicationslpdfs/NAMAenvironmentalFINALpdf" Other concessions, such as enforcing
industrialized country intellectual property rights, may deprive the poor in the developing world
of access to essential medicines or deprive farmers of the traditional right to save, breed, and
replant seeds. See Mark Weisbrot, David Rosnick, and Dean Baker, Poor Numbers: The Impact
of Trade Liberalization on World Poverty (Center for Economic and Policy Analysis, 2004),
http://www.cepr.net/publications/poornumbers.htin; Ha-Joon Change, Globalisation, Economic
Development, and the Role of the State 297-98 (2003). Other concessions, such as enforcing
industrialized country intellectual property rights, may deprive the poor in the developing world
of access to essential medicines or deprive farmers of the traditional right to save, breed, and
replant seeds. See MARK WEISBROT ET AL., CENT. FOR ECON. AND POLICY ANALYSIS, POOR
NUMBERS: THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION ON WORLD POVERTY 3 (Nov. 2004),
http://www.cepr.net/publications/poor-numbers.htm; HA-JOON CHANG, GLOBALISATION,
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE 297-98 (2003).
133. See HA-JOON CHANG, supra note 132, at 258-59, 276-77; HA-JOON CHANG,
KICKING AWAY HE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 19-51, 59-
66 (Anthem Press 2002); Ha-Joon Chang, The Market, the State and Institutions in Economic
Development, in RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, supra note 56, at 43.
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the Newly Industrializing Countries of South Korea and Taiwan
successfully industrialized their economies through the use of tariffs,
subsidies, technology transfer requirements, and regulation of foreign
investment.'34 Under the guise of "leveling the playing field," the free
market reforms advocated by international trade and financial
institutions (even if applied prospectively in an even-handed manner to
both developed and developing countries) will reinforce the economic
subordination of the developing world by depriving developing
countries of the protectionist tools used by developed countries to
diversify and industrialize their economies. These tools include the
deliberate promotion of those industries most likely to enhance long-
term national economic welfare based on contemporary market condi-
tions (as opposed to historically imposed patterns of raw material pro-
duction) and based on each country's unique endowment of natural and
human resources.135 Thus, the economic concessions that developing
countries must make in order to secure agricultural trade liberalization
are likely to perpetuate the patterns of agro-export specialization rooted
in the colonial past that contribute to poverty and hunger. 36
Third, the reduction or elimination of agricultural subsidies and tariff
barriers is anticipated to make fanning less remunerative in the United
States and the European Union and to produce a shift of large-scale
agro-export production to lower cost producers in the developing
world.'37 The expanded cultivation of export monocultures in
developing countries would likely produce serious ecosystem harm by
eroding crop diversity, accelerating deforestation, and encouraging the
over-utilization of pesticides, fertilizers and irrigation water.
138
134. See Ha-Joon Chang, The East Asian Development Experience, in RETHINKING
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, supra note 56, at 111-17.
135. See HA-JOON CHANG & ILENE GRABEL, RECLAIMING DEVELOPMENT: AN
ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC POLICY MANUAL, 70-80 (2004) (explaining the important role of the
state in shaping industrial development and critiquing the view that industrial development
should be left to the dictates of the market).
136. See Howard Stein, Rethinking African Development, in RETHINKINGDEVELOPMENT
ECONOMICS, supra note 56, at 156.
137. See van der Mensbrugghe, supra note 33, at 130.
138. See Kym Anderson, Trade Liberalization and the Environment, in THE GREENING
OF WORLD TRADE ISSUES 152-54 (Kym Anderson & Richard Blackhurst, eds., 1992). For
example, during the last decade, the explosive growth of agro-export production in Brazil has
coincided with accelerated deforestation (as forests are converted to farm land and pasture land)
and with increased use of agrochemicals. See Larry Rohter, South America Seeks to Fill the
World's Table, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2004, at A1, A22.
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Increased agro-export production in developing countries is also likely
to benefit large-scale, highly capitalized commercial growers at the
expense of small farmers, thereby increasing poverty and hunger.'39
Because market prices for agricultural commodities do not reflect these
"externalities," it would be a mistake to regard the shift of agro-export
specialization to the developing world as "efficient." Indeed, such an
approach would disregard the ways in which agro-export specialization
impoverishes developing countries, destroys the livelihoods of small
farmers, and degrades the natural resource base necessary for food
production.
Neoclassical trade theory is largely based on David Ricardo's theory
of comparative advantage, which advocates specialization by each
country in those commodities best suited to it by virtue of natural or
historical circumstances and trade among countries for the commodities
not produced domestically.' 40 Thus, from a neoclassical trade theory
perspective, countries with abundant natural resources and little capital
should capitalize on their "comparative advantage" by specializing in
the production of primary agricultural commodities and purchasing
manufactured goods from industrialized countries.
4 1
Unfortunately, the agro-export specialization promoted by
neoclassical trade theory is fundamentally at odds with the economic
diversification required for food security and with the biological
diversity necessary for ecosystem health. Neoclassical trade theory
neglects to recognize that extending the principle of specialization from
the factory to the field jeopardizes long-term agricultural production by
degrading the soil, depleting freshwater resources, increasing the
vulnerability of the food supply to pests and disease, and encroaching
upon forests and wetlands that provide valuable ecosystem services. 42
Similarly, rigid adherence by the IMF and the World Bank to
neoclassical notions of "comparative advantage" in agro-export
139. See COOTE, supra note 95, at 194-95; MURPHY, supra note 130, at 8; MADELEY,
supra note, 105, at 76-77; THRuPP, BITrERswEET HARVESTS FOR GLOBAL SUPERMARKETS,
supra note 109, at 67-7 1.
140. See PAUL SAMUELSON, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE, ECONOMICS 630
( lIth ed. 1980).
141. See Fred P. Gale, Economic Specialization Versus Ecological Diversification: The
Trade Policy Implications of Taking the Ecosystem Approach Seriously, 34 ECOLOGICAL
ECONOMICS 285, 288-89 (2000).
142. See id. at 289-90.
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production have condemned many developing countries to poverty and
hunger by precluding the implementation of forward-looking
development strategies designed to achieve economic diversification
and industrialization.'43 Thus, even if the playing field were "leveled,"
by removing agricultural subsidies and import barriers in developed
countries, the economic specialization promoted by neoclassical trade
theory would nevertheless produce poverty, hunger, and environmental
degradation in the developing world.
In order to ensure that the international trade regime genuinely
benefits developing countries, it is imperative that trade liberalization
in the industrialized world be accompanied by reforms in the rules
governing international trade that would permit developing countries to
avail themselves of the protectionist tools historically used by
developed countries to diversify and industrialize their economies.
Rather than being relegated to patterns of agro-export specialization
introduced during the colonial period, developing countries must be
permitted to utilize tariffs, subsidies and other forms of state
intervention in order to promote those industries most likely to
contribute to long-term national well-being. As explained in Part V
below, only an asymmetrical set of rules requiring the phase-out of
agricultural protection in the industrialized world and permitting certain
forms of protectionism in the developing world can give developing
countries the flexibility to adopt policies designed to alleviate poverty,
promote economic development and protect the natural resource base
necessary for food production.
V. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO PROMOTE ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE
Reform of international trade policy must begin by re-
conceptualizing trade as a means to important social ends (such as food
security and ecological sustainability) rather than an end in itself. The
right to food is enshrined as a basic human right in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights' and in the Covenant on Economic,
143. See Stein, supra note 136, at 156.
144. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at art.25, U.N.
GAOR, (Dec 12, 1948).
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Social and Cultural Rights 45 Likewise, the Convention on Biological
Diversity recognizes the intrinsic value of biodiversity, its important
role in providing for the food, health and other needs of human beings,
and the paramount obligation of each state to protect the practices,
knowledge and innovation of indigenous and local communities
relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. 146
International trade law must be harmonized with the right to food and
with the related goal of protecting biodiversity. For the reasons
explained in the preceding section, international trade law cannot be
reconciled with food security or ecological sustainability as long as its
single-minded objective is the elimination of government intervention
in order to maximize agro-export specialization.
Second, the promotion of food security in developing countries
requires economic diversification and industrialization. Eliminating
the double standards that systematically benefit transnational agri-
business at the expense of small farmers in the developing world is an
important first step in a larger reform agenda, but it will not achieve
food security in developing countries in the absence of measures to
facilitate economic diversification and industrialization. Rather than
restricting the ability of developing countries to engage in strategic
intervention in order to foster long-term economic development, the
rules governing international trade should be changed to permit
developing countries to utilize the very protectionist instruments
historically used by developed countries to achieve their economic
might. Developing countries must secure the flexibility to utilize a wide
array of protectionist instruments to nurture infant domestic industries,
promote food security, protect the environment, preserve the livelihoods
and ways of life of small farmers and indigenous communities, and
forge dynamic links between foreign investment and the local economy.
Third, the rules governing international trade should address the
distortions in global agricultural markets caused by transnational
corporations. International agricultural trade is conducted by a handful
of large corporations-not by farmers or countries. In order to ensure
that international trade benefits farmers, consumers and developing
145. See International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
146. See Convention on Biological Diversity, preamble and art. 8(j), reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 818 (1992).
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countries, international trade rules should be modified to target the
concentrations of corporate power that can lead to monopolistic abuse.
One way to implement the proposals outlined above is for developing
countries to work collectively in the current round of WTO negotiations
to modify the rules governing international trade. Indeed, developing
countries walked out of the WTO negotiations in Cancun, Mexico, in
September 2003, to protest the intransigence of the U.S. and the EU on
the question of agricultural subsidies. 147 The negotiations did not resume
until the U.S. and the EU made concessions on this point. 4 8 Developing
countries have also pressed for an exception to the WTO rules that
would permit developing countries to use protectionist measures
designed to promote food security and rural development. 149 Notwith-
standing the small victory in Cancun, it is immensely difficult to hold
together a coalition of highly heterogeneous developing countries with
conflicting interests and priorities in the face of intense pressure from
the U.S. and the EU for further economic concessions. Furthermore, the
closed door, secretive nature of WTO negotiations and the aggressive
bullying and arm-twisting of developing countries by industrialized
countries make it difficult for the concerns of developing countries to
be adequately addressed. 5 °
147. See Elizabeth Becker, Poorer Countries Pull Out of Talks Over World Trade, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2003, at Al.
148. See Elizabeth Becker, Trade Group to Cut Farm Subsidies for Rich Nations, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 1, 2004, at 8; Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Will Cut Farm Subsidies in Trade Deal, N.Y.
TIMES, July 31, 2004, at Al. These concessions were formalized in the December 2005 WTO
Ministerial meeting in Hong Kong. WTO member states agreed to eliminate agricultural export
subsidies by 2013, but no agreement was reached on domestic farm subsidies or agricultural
tariffs. Since export subsidies account for only a small fraction of the distortions in world
agricultural markets resulting from protectionist policies, the failure to reach consensus on
domestic farm subsidies and agricultural tariffs does not bode well for developing countries that
are heavily dependent on agro-export production. See Keith Bradsher, Trade Officials Agree to
End Subsidies for Agricultural Exports, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2005; Don Lee, Delegates Eke
Out a Trade Deal, L.A. Times, Dec. 19, 2005, at C1.
149. These proposed exceptions to the WTO rules are generally referred to collectively
as the "Development Box" proposal. See SOPHIA MURPHY & STEVE SUPPAN, INT'L INST. FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, INTRODUCTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT Box: FINDING SPACE FRR
DEVELOPMENT CONCERNS IN THE WTO's AGRICULTURE NEGOTIATIONS (2003),
http://www.iisd.org/pdfl2003/trade-introdev.box.pdf.
150. See generally FATOUMATA JAWARA & AILEEN KWA, BEHIND THE SCENES AT THE
WTO: THE REAL WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (2003) (describing the
WTO decision-making processes and decrying the lack of transparency and meaningful
participation by developing countries).
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A second approach is for developing countries in the Western
Hemisphere to band together into a regional trade pact as a
counterweight to the economic power of the United States and the
European Union. Some commentators have pointed to the key role of
Brazil in the collapse of the WTO negotiations in Cancun, Mexico, and
in the ongoing negotiation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FrAA), and have suggested that Brazilian president Inacio Lula da
Silva is actively promoting a vision of regional integration in Latin
America as an alternative to the FTAA.' 5' Regrettably, the Lula
administration has been mired in a corruption scandal, and the prospects
of bold initiatives on the part of the Brazilian president have therefore
dimmed.
i 2
A third approach is for individual developing countries to defy free
market orthodoxy. Cuba, for example, achieved an unprecedented
degree of food security in the last fifteen years by rejecting agro-export
specialization as a development strategy, promoting economic
diversification, prioritizing food production for the domestic market,
and endorsing and supporting organic and semi-organic farming
techniques. 153 However, Cuba's unique national experiment with
sustainable agriculture was a response to the economic crisis occasioned
by the collapse of the socialist trading bloc and the tightening of the
U.S. economic embargo, and was facilitated by Cuba's economic
isolation, including its exclusion from major trade and financial
institutions (such as the IMF, the World Bank, and regional trade
agreements).' 54 It is unclear whether this experiment will survive once
the U.S. embargo is lifted and Cuba is reintegrated into the world
trading system.' 5 Most recently, Argentina's extraordinary recovery
from its December 2001 economic collapse was attributed, at least in
151. See Simon Romero, Trade Talks in Miami End Early, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2003,
at C 1-2; William Greider and Kenneth Rapoza, Lula Raises the Stakes, THE NATION, Dec. 1,
2002, at 11-17. Indeed, Lula had earlier denounced the FTAA as a "type of economic
annexation of Latin America by the U.S." Raymond Colitt, Mistrustful Brazilians Mobilize
Against Proposed Trade Pact, FINANCIALTIMES (London), Sept. 10, 2002, at 12 (quoting Lula's
characterization of the proposed FIAA during the 2002 Brazilian presidential campaign).
152. See, e.g., Monte Reel, Brazil's Corruption Scandals Loom on President's Political
Horizon, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2005, at A14.
153. See Gonzalez, Seasons of Resistance, supra note 66, at 712-28 (describing and
evaluating Cuba's economic reforms in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union).
154. See id. at 729-30.
155. See id. at 730-32.
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part, to the decision by the Peronist-led government to disregard some
of the policy prescriptions of the IMF.
1 16
Finally, even if developing countries are able to obtain some measure
of policy flexibility to protect the environment, promote food security,
and diversify and industrialize their economies, there is no guarantee
that national elites in developing countries will in fact adopt measures
that serve the common good rather than their own narrow self-interest.
It is therefore important to vindicate the right to food and the emerging
right to a healthy environment in both domestic and international
tribunals 57-and in the popular discourse. Human rights law and human
rights discourse can serve as valuable tools to empower civil society to
demand reforms at the national and international level to protect the
basic right of all human beings to sufficient, safe and nutritious food
and to preserve the health of the ecosystem upon which human survival
depends.
VI. TOWARD A THEORY OF ENViRONMENTAL JUSTICE AT THE
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is possible to draw some
preliminary conclusions about the meaning of environmental justice at
156. Larry Rohter, Economic Rally for Argentines Defies Forecasts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
26, 2004, at Al.
157. See, e.g., Barry E. Hill, et al., Human Rights and the Environment: A Synopsis and
Some Predictions, 16 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 359 (2004) (describing the growing
international recognition of the right to a clean and healthy environment); Sumudu Atapattu,
The Right to a Healthy Life or the Right to Die Polluted? The Emergence of a Human Right to
a Healthy Environment under International Law, 16 TUL ENVTL L. J. 65 (2002) (discussing
the evolution of the right to a healthy environment under international law); U.N.G.A., Report
of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Right to Food, A/57/356
(27 August 2002) (assessing progress toward the realization of the right to food); U.N. ECON.
& SOC. COUNCIL, SUB-COMM. ON ECON., SOc. & CULTURAL RIGHTS, Substantive Issues Arising
in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11), E/C. 12/1999/5 (12 May 1999) (discussing the
implementation of the right to food under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights); Anthony Paul Kearns III, The Right to Food Exists Via Customary
International Law, 22 SUFR)LK TRANSNAT'LL. REV. 223 (1998) (arguing for the existence of
a right to food under customary international law); Donald E. Buckingham, A Recipe for
Change: Towards an Integrated Approach to Food Under International Law, 6 PACE INT'L L.
REV. 285 (1994) (proposing an approach to food under international law that integrates
international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and international trade law).
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the international level. In the United States, the term "environmental
justice" refers both to a grassroots social movement 158 and to an
intellectual paradigm through which to view environmental law.1 59 This
Part seeks to articulate how one might incorporate environmental justice
principles into analyses of activities and projects that may have
significant environmental and environmental justice implications
outside of the United States, such as trade agreements, development
assistance projects, and the economic policies imposed by multilateral
financial institutions.
First, environmental justice is firmly rooted in fundamental human
rights. These include the rights to life, health and cultural integrity; the
right to food; the right to self-determination; the right to be free from all
forms of racial discrimination; and the emerging rights to a healthy
environment, to environmental information, to public participation, and
to redress for environmental harm. " An environmental justice analysis
evaluates the degree to which the project or activity in question fulfills
or frustrates basic human rights.
Second, one goal of environmental justice is to promote equitable
access to environmental necessities (such as food and water) and to
ensure that no communities are disproportionately burdened by
pollution or natural resource degradation. Thus, an environmental
justice analysis will assess the larger economic and political factors that
produce environmental degradation and will evaluate how a particular
project or activity distributes economic benefits and environmental
burdens among and within nations, with particular attention to the
impact on historically disadvantaged communities.
Third, an environmental justice analysis at the international level
must be particularly attentive to structural inequities that have their
origins in colonialism. These include the inequitable distribution of
wealth between developed and developing countries (and within
158. See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 19, at 19-33 (2001) (describing the origins of the
environmental justice movement in the United States).
159. See, e.g., Richard Lazarus, Environmental Justice and the Teaching of
Environmental Law, 96 W. VA. L. REv. 1025 (1994) (pointing out that viewing environmental
law through from an environmental justice perspective requires looking at the distributional
implications of environmental regulation).
160. See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Beyond Eco-Imperialism: An Environmental Justice
Critique of Free Trade, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 979, 1014-15 (2001) (describing the ways in
which human rights law can be used to promote environmental justice).
[14:345
HeinOnline  -- 14 Mich. St. J. Int'l L. 378 2006
Agricultural Trade Policy
developing countries) resulting from the colonial domination and
plunder of many developing countries; the inordinate influence of
developed countries in determining the work and priorities of
multilateral trade and financial institutions; international trade, lending
and investment practices that disproportionately burden the poor in
developing countries and degrade essential natural resources; the
exploitation of the poor and destruction of the environment by
transnational corporations headquartered in developed countries; and
the historic and ongoing subordination of indigenous peoples and
indigenous political and legal systems. An environmental justice
approach to international environmental problems seeks to mitigate the
structural inequities that reinforce the privileged position of developed
countries at the expense of the poor, indigenous peoples, racial and
ethnic minorities, and the environment in the developing world.
Fourth, an environmental justice analysis takes into account the
ideologies of European racial superiority, originating in colonialism,
that privilege the economic, environmental and cultural practices of the
industrialized world over those of the developing world. 161 To take an
example relevant to agricultural policy, advocates of agricultural trade
liberalization often tout as a benefit the generation of cash income for
"modernizing farming practices., ,1 62 As anthropologist Arturo Escobar
points out, the discourse of "modernization" belittles the value of
traditional and subsistence agricultural practices in favor of cash crop
production based on large, mechanized farms utilizing agrochemical
inputs. 163 Thus, in addition to considerations of self-interest, developed
countries' advocacy of agro-export-led economic growth and disdain
for developing countries' desire to include food security and rural
development in the WTO agriculture negotiations may be grounded in
the belief that "modern" agricultural practices are inherently superior to
161. See Tseming Yang, International Environmental Protection, in JUSTICE AND
NATURALRESOURCES: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES, AND APPLICATIONS 94-95 (Kathryn M. Mutz,
ed. 2002) (discussing the philosophical underpinnings of colonialism).
162. See, e.g., Aksoy & Beghin, supra note 121, at 1.
163. See ARTURO ESCOBAR, ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND
UNMAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD 43 (1995). As Professor Escobar points out, "peasants
figured in development discourse only as a somewhat bothersome and undifferentiated mass
with an invisible face: they were part of the amorphous "surplus population," which sooner or
later would be absorbed by a blooming urban economy." Id. at 157.
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traditional or indigenous practices.1" It is therefore imperative for an
environmental justice analysis to highlight the relationship between
cultural diversity and biological diversity. 165 Respect for cultural
diversity is essential to the preservation of distinct approaches to natural
resource use that are uniquely compatible with local conditions, are
generally more sustainable than "modem" methods, and are often
deeply rooted in spiritual and cultural practices. 166  Indeed, the
Convention on Biological Diversity expressly requires states to protect
and preserve the traditional practices and lifestyles of indigenous and
local communities. 
167
Fifth, an environmental justice analysis seeks to empower the
communities directly affected by pollution, natural resource degrada-
tion, or inequitable access to natural resources. Drawing upon the
lessons of the environmental justice movement in the United States and
of grassroots ecological struggles in developing countries, an environ-
mental justice analysis adopts a "bottom up" rather than "top-down"
approach, and seeks to promote transparent and meaningful participa-
tion by the affected communities in governmental decision-making at
the local, regional and national levels as well as in the decision-making
of multilateral development banks, corporate investors, donor agencies,
and bilateral and multilateral trade institutions.1 68 One of the hallmarks
of an environmental justice analysis is recognition of the transformative
164. See James Thuo Gathii, Open Democratic Participation Scheme for the World
Trade Organization: Process and Substance in WTO Reform, 56 RUTGERS L. REv. 885, 903
(2004).
165. See Yang, supra note 161, at 102-03.
166. See id; THRUPP, LINING BIODIVERSITY AND AGRICULTURE, supra note 44, at 18-
19. Studies have shown that low-input agricultural production methods have improved food
production in Africa, Asia and Latin America using low cost, locally available and
environmentally friendly practices and technologies. Jules N. Pretty et al., Reducing Food
Poverty by Increasing Sustainability in Developing Countries, 95 AGRIC., ECOSYSTEMS &
ENV'T 217-34 (2003); Jules Pretty & Rachel Hine, The Promising Spread of Sustainable
Agriculture in Asia, 24 NAT. RESOURCES FORuM 107-21 (2000); Jules Pretty, Can Sustainable
Agriculture Feed Africa? New Evidence on Progress, Processes and Impacts, 1 ENVT, DEV.
AND SUSTAINABIUTY 253-74 (1999).
167. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 146, art. 80).
168. For example, the community-based assessment of structural adjustment discussed
in Part IH of this article (the SAPRIN study) expressed great concern that the economic policies
at issue had been designed by technical experts in the World Bank, the IMF, and the national
ministries of Planning, Finance and Agriculture without any participation by the people most
directly affected by these policies. See SAPRIN, supra note 105, at 113.
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power of collective struggle that enables individuals and communities
to "speak for themselves" and to participate in the decisions that will
profoundly affect their quality of life. 69
An example of community empowerment is the challenge mounted
by Brazil's Landless Workers' Movement (MST) to the market-oriented
model of agrarian reform implemented by the World Bank in Brazil.
1 70
The MST initially filed a formal claim with the World Bank's
Inspection Panel alleging that the land reform program violated the
World Bank's own mandate. 171 While the MST did not prevail in its
claim, the MST's objections served to educate both the Brazilian state
and the public about the pitfalls of an agrarian reform program that did
not grapple with the deeper structural inequities in Brazilian society,
including the disproportionate power of rural oligarchs, the legal
impunity of the wealthy, the rampant corruption of legal processes, and
pervasive poverty. 72 The MST's relentless criticism of superficial, de-
politicized agrarian reform demonstrated that even the poorest
Brazilians could be mobilized into a social force capable of transform-
ing the public debate and participating in the affairs of the nation. 173
Finally, an environmental justice analysis at the international level
applies a variety of concepts of social justice to international environ-
mental problems. 74 These include distributional equity (equitable
distribution of environmental burdens and equitable access to
environmental necessities), procedural fairness (models of decision-
making that enhance the ability of disadvantaged groups to participate),
169. See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 19, at 13-15.
170. See ANGUS WRIGHT & WENDY WoLK)RD, To INHERIT THE EARTH: THE LANDLESS
MOVEMENT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR A NEW BRAZIL 322 (2003). The World Bank's program
was premised on the assumption that the Brazilian political system is fundamentally sound and
that land reform could be achieved within the context of existing political and economic
arrangements by merely making credit available to those wishing to acquire land. This program
failed to address the significant social problems that impeded genuine land reform in Brazil,
including government corruption, fierce resistance by rural oligarchs, and legal impunity for
wealthy Brazilians who resorted to violence in order to quell popular demands for land
redistribution. See id. at 208-10, 321-23.
171. See id. at 322.
172. See id. at 322-23.
173. See id. at 323.
174. See Kuehn, supra note 39, for a discussion of these distinct approaches to
environmental justice. See also Rucmi ANAND, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A
NORTH-SOUTH DIMENSION 123-39 (2004) (examining environmental justice in the international
context).
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and corrective justice (the obligation to provide compensation to
communities harmed by environmental degradation and to repair the
harm). An international environmental justice analysis must be mindful
of the ways in which other forms of social injustice (based, for example,
on race, gender, class, caste, and ethnicity) compound environmental
injustice and of the unique local conditions that produce environmental
injustice in any particular case.
175
CONCLUSION
Using agricultural trade as an example, this article has conducted an
environmental justice analysis of the impact in developing countries of
the neoliberal policy prescriptions of the IMF, the World Bank and the
WTO. The article has examined the complex ways in which the rules
governing international trade in agricultural products and the structural
adjustment programs of the IMF and the World Bank have reinforced
pre-existing patterns of trade and production that undermine the
livelihoods of poor farmers in the developing world and degrade the
environment. However, the insights of the article are not confined to the
agricultural sector. Rather, the environmental justice principles and the
analytical methodology deployed in the article can be utilized to assess
the ecological and socioeconomic impact of trade agreements affecting
other economic sectors as well as international lending and development
assistance programs. Indeed, the systematic assessment through the lens
of environmental justice of trade agreements, development assistance
programs, and the economic policies imposed by multilateral financial
institutions could facilitate the early identification of negative
ecological and socioeconomic consequences as well as inconsistencies
with legal instruments designed to protect human rights and the
environment. Such assessments could also serve as valuable tools to
promote transparency and public participation.
175. See Gonzalez, Beyond Eco-Imperialism: An Environmental Justice Critique of Free
Trade, supra note 160, at 1014.
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